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In 1967, Mr. Jangaba Augustine Johnson entered Mr. Wheeler's
barbershop seeking a haircut.' Mr. Wheeler, licensed barber and owner
of the shop, refused service to Mr. Johnson because of his race.2 At that
time, Mr. Johnson lived in a culture that forced him to travel from shop
to shop, or even from town to town, simply to find a barbershop or a
lunch counter that would serve him.
Nearly forty years later, a woman enters her local pharmacy holding
a lawful prescription for emergency contraception. Frightened and nerv-
ous, she hands the prescription to the pharmacist, only to be scolded by
the person looking down his nose at her: "I will not fill this prescription.
I will not help you kill your fetus." The woman is humiliated, and, even
worse, is unable to get the drugs she badly needs to prevent an un-
wanted pregnancy. Living in an isolated area, the nearest alternative
pharmacy is far away and the woman lacks transportation. Unless she is
able to find a pharmacy that will fill her prescription, she will risk facing
an unintended and unwanted pregnancy.'
As in the case of Jangaba Johnson, our legal system would not allow
pharmacists to refuse to fill an individual's prescriptions because of the
individual's race. Why, then, do we tolerate refusals to fill prescriptions
that are needed to protect the health of women? Just as Mr. Johnson was
refused service at a barbershop in 1967 because of his race, women
across the United States are facing similar refusals of service on the basis
of their sex, as they enter pharmacies in an attempt to access basic health
care: emergency contraception.4 These incidents are not isolated, and
1. In re Johnson, 427 P.2d 968, 969 (Wash. 1967).
2. In reJohnson, 427 P.2d at 969.
3. See Josh Fiet, The Drug War, THE STRANGER, June 7, 2006, available at http://
www.thestranger.com/seattle/Content?oid=37399.
4. See Marc Kaufman, Plan B Battles Embroil States, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 27, 2006,
at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/
02/26/AR2006022601380.html.
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they are occurring on a regular basis in the state of Washington and
across the country.
Refusals are being justified on the notion that pharmacists with
moral or religious objections to the medication should be permitted to
refuse to dispense the medication based on their beliefs.' Some pharma-
cists object based on a belief that the drug is an abortifacient,7 while
others simply object to dispensing all forms of contraception.8 Permit-
ting pharmacists to refuse to dispense certain medications allows the
religious or moral beliefs of the pharmacist to override the patient's need
for basic health care.
Although the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
recently approved over-the-counter sales of emergency contraception,
the agency does require that the drug be kept behind the counter at a
licensed pharmacy and that the pharmacist or pharmacy assistant verify
the woman's age prior to sale.9 Accordingly, women remain at the mercy
of their pharmacist when they require access to emergency contracep-
tion.
Thankfully, in response to Mr. Johnson's claim of discrimination in
the barbershop, the Supreme Court of Washington held that Mr.
Wheeler's conduct was unlawful. Refusing to serve a patron because of
his race in a barbershop, a place of public accommodation, was dis-
criminatory and constituted an unfair practice under RCW 49.60, also
known as the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD).1 0
When the Washington legislature added sex to its public accommoda-
tion statute, it intended to protect women from the very same type of
5. The Washington State Board of Pharmacy has received complaints from patients who
have been refused prescriptions. Kyung M. Song, Women Complain After Pharmacies
Refuse Prescriptions, SEATrLE TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006, at A5. Additionally, many women
across the country have contacted their local Planned Parenthood Clinics to report
such refusals. Kara Loewentheil, Planned Parenthood Refrsed at the Counter
(Oct. 20, 2004) http:llwww.plannedparenthood.orgnews-articles-presslpolitics-
policy-issues/ birth-control-access-prevention/counter-refusal-6486.htm.
6. See Cara Solomon, Druggists Want Right to Say "No" to Certain Medications, SEATTLE
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at Al, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/
localnews/2002858143_pharmacyl lm.html; Rob Stein, Pharmacists' Rights at Front
of New Debate, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 28, 2005, A01.
7. See Kaufman, supra note 4.
8. CBSNews.com, The Drugstore War (Nov. 23, 2004), http://www.cbsnews.coml
stories/2004/11/23/eveningnews/main657435.shtml.
9. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Over-the-Counter Access for
Plan B For Women 18 and Older, Prescription Remains Required For Those 17 and Under
(Aug. 24, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2006/NEWO1436.html.
10. In re Johnson, 427 P.2d 968, 973 (Wash. 1967).
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discrimination faced by Mr. Johnson in 1967." Just as Mr. Johnson was
refused service because of his race, so too was the woman refused service
because of her sex as she was denied access to a medicine that affects
only the health of women. Additionally, because the remedial provision
of the WLAD "is to be liberally construed in order to encourage private
enforcement,"' 2 the woman may pursue a claim against the pharmacist
for sex discrimination in a place of public accommodation.
This Article will demonstrate that a pharmacist's refusal to fill a
valid prescription for emergency contraception constitutes sex discrimi-
nation and violates the WLAD. Part I explains the nature and function
of emergency contraceptive pills (ECPs) as well as their role in basic
health care for women and the importance of their accessibility. Part II
addresses federal civil rights protections and the failure of these protec-
tions to provide relief for women facing refusals. Focusing on the
WLAD, Part II also explains how state public accommodation statutes
protect women from discrimination in places of public accommodation.
It further sets forth the prima facie case of such a claim where a woman
is refused access to emergency contraception. Part III presents argu-
ments likely to be submitted by a pharmacist facing litigation under the
WLAD. Finally, Part IV illustrates how Washington public policy sup-
ports women and the protection of reproductive freedom. The Article
concludes with suggestions for judicial interpretation.
I. EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION: FUNCTION AND IMPORTANCE
A. Emergency Contraception is not an Abortifacient
Some pharmacists have concerns that ECPs function to perform an
abortion based on its mechanism of function and the erroneous belief
that it is an abortifacient. 3 A religious perspective is that pregnancy be-
gins at the moment of fertilization, making any contraceptive which
interferes with implantation a means of terminating a pregnancy and,
therefore, means of obtaining an abortion. 4 In contrast, under the
11. See generally Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fra-
ternal Order of Eagles, 59 P.3d 655, 666-667 (Wash. 2002); MacLean v. First Nw.
Indus. of Am., Inc., 635 P.2d 683, 685-686 (Wash. 1981).
12. Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese of Seattle, 829 P.2d 196, 207 (Wash. Ct. App.
1992) (citation omitted).
13. Susan A. Cohen, Objections, Confusion Among Pharmacists Threaten Access to Emer-
gency Contraception, 2 GUTrMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y 1, 1-3 (June 1999).
14. See Katherine A. White, Note, Crisis of Conscience: Reconciling Religious Health Care
Providers' Beliefi and Patients' Rights, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1703, 1715 n.75 (1999)
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American Medical Association's (AMA) definition, the beginning of
pregnancy is the implantation of a fertilized egg in the uterus. 5 ECPs do
not affect pregnancy because they do not affect an implanted fertilized
egg." The controversy exists based on whether we accept the religious
view or the AMAs view of conception. Because we are discussing the
dispensing of medication, it is logical that we should accept the latter
view of conception. Moreover, if we fail to use accepted medical research
and practice, the prospect is raised that any interest group may manipu-
late law and policy based on a religious agenda. Accordingly, under
accepted medical science, because ECPs have no effect on implantation,
emergency contraception is not an abortifacient but is just as the name
implies: contraception.
It is important to clarify the nature and mechanisms of the drug
that is the subject of such controversy. Emergency contraception, sold
under the brand name Plan B, is a method of contraception to be used
after unprotected sex, as a means of preventing pregnancy. 7 A woman
has a 56-89% chance of preventing an unintended pregnancy by using
ECPs. 8 The pills contain progestin (levonogestrel), a synthetic hormone
that has safely been used to prevent pregnancy for over 35 years.' 9 The
drug functions primarily by interfering with ovulation. ° While previous
studies have indicated that ECPs may prevent fertilization and implanta-
tion,2' a more recent study found that most often ECPs function to
reduce the risk of pregnancy by inhibiting ovulation.22 Moreover, the
(quoting National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives
for Catholic Health Care Services, 16 (Directive 36) (1995)).
15. Donald W. Herbe, The Right to Refitse: A Call forAdequate Protection of a Pharmacist's
Right to Refrse Facilitation of Abortion and Emergency Contraception, 17 J.L. &
HEALTH 77, 86 (2002-03).
16. James Trussell et al., Effectiveness of the Yuzpe Regimen of Emergency Contraception by
Cycle Day of Intercourse: Implications for Mechanism of Action, 67 CONTRACEPTION
167, 167 (2003).
17. FDA's Decision Regarding Plan B: Questions and Answers, U.S. Food &
Drug Admin. (May 7, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/planB/
planBQandA.htm [hereinafter FDA Questions and Answers].
18. Rachel K. Jones et al., Contraceptive Use Among U.S. Women Having Abortions in
2000-2001, 34 PERSPECTIVES ON SExUAL & REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 294, 301
(Nov.-Dec. 2002).
19. FDA Questions and Answers, supra note 17.
20. Id.
21. Prescription Drug Products; Certain Combined Oral Contraceptives for Use as Post-
coital Emergency Contraception, 62 Fed. Reg. 8610, 8611 (Feb. 25, 1997).
22. Lena Marions et al., Emergency Contraception with Mifepristone and Levonorgestrel:
Mechanism ofAction, 100 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 65, 65 (July 2002), available
at http://acogjnl.highwire.org/cgi/content/full/100/1/65.
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study suggests that levonogestrel has no effect on fertilization or implan-
tation whatsoever.
2 3
Another common objection to ECPs is based on confusion with an
entirely different drug, mifepristone or "the abortion pill." To clarify,
emergency contraception is not the same as mifepristone, a drug used to
terminate an early pregnancy up to seven weeks after the last menstrual
24
cycle. Mifepristone functions to block hormones necessary for an es-
21tablished pregnancy to continue. In contrast, ECPs function to prevent
a pregnancy from ever occurring, and, in fact, will not affect an already-
established pregnancy.26 As a result, ECPs by preventing unintended
pregnancies, reduce the need for abortions.
A final point to emphasize is the fact that ECPs, while effective in
pregnancy prevention if taken within 72 hours of unprotected inter-
course, are more effective the earlier they are taken.27 A refusal to
provide ECPs results in a patient having to travel to another pharmacy,
taking up valuable time, and such delay endangers the patient's ability to
acquire her lawfully-prescribed drug in a time frame which will allow
the drug to be effective. This delay is most pressing for women in rural
areas who will be forced to travel to neighboring towns seeking a phar-
macist to fill their much-needed, time-sensitive prescriptions.
B. Contraception is Basic Health Carefor Women
For over thirty years of their lives, most women have the biological
potential for pregnancy. Without contraception, the average woman is
likely to become pregnant approximately twelve to fifteen times over the
course of her reproductive life.28 In any given year, eighty-five out of 100
sexually active women of childbearing age who are not using contracep-
tion will become pregnant.29
23. Id. at 70.
24. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Patient Information Sheet: Mifepristone (marketed as
Mifeprex), (July 20, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/cderldrugllnfoSheetslpatientl
mifepristonePlS.htm.
25. Id.
26. See FDA Questions and Answers, supra note 17.
27. Task Force on Postovulatory Methods of Fertility Regulation, World Health Org.,
Randomized Controlled Trial of Levonorgestrel Versus the Yuzpe Regimen of Combined
Oral Contraceptives for Emergency Contraception, 352 THE LANCET 428, 428-33
(1998).
28. See Luella Klein, To Have or Not to Have a Pregnancy, 65 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOL-
OGY 1, 1 (1985).
29. ROBERTA A. HATCHER ET AL., CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 312 (17th rev. ed.
1998).
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Contraception is basic and essential health care for women. In fact,
the paramount public health authority in the United States, the Centers
for Disease Control (CDC), lists family planning and contraceptive care
as one of the ten great public health achievements of the twentieth cen-
tury0 because contraception has demonstrably improved the life and
health expectancy of women and children. 1 Accordingly, it should come
as no surprise that more than nine in ten women in the United States
who are at risk of unintended pregnancy (women who are sexually ac-
tive, able to become pregnant, and neither pregnant nor trying to
become pregnant) are using a contraceptive method 2 Because it is clear
that contraception is a basic health need for women, it should be equally
clear that ECPs are a necessary form of contraception and are crucial to
ensuring that women maintain control over their reproductive system.
II. ACCESS TO EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION Is LEGALLY
PROTECTED IN WASHINGTON STATE
A. Federal Civil Rights Protections
The laws and policies underlying our nation's prohibition against
discrimination have evolved over time. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
effected a broad prohibition on discrimination in or by "public accom-
modations."33 One might assume that the United States Constitution
and federal civil rights laws would provide broad protections against dis-
crimination for women. 4 However, while federal laws do provide some
30. Center for Disease Control, Ten Great Public Health Achievements-United States,
1900-1999, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 241, 241-43 (1999), avail-
able at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00056796.htm.
31. Centers for Disease Control, Achievements in Public Health, 1900-1999: Family
Planning, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1073, 1073 (1999).
32. See J. Abma et al., Fertility, Family Planning and Women's Health: New Data from the
1995 National Survey of Family Growth, VITAL & HEALTH STAT., May 1997, at 49.
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2000).
34. This Article does not address whether women may be able to raise a constitutional
objection to the denial of ECPs. However, such a claim would arise under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is doubtful that such an action
would be recognized by the courts because a pharmacist's refusal to dispense ECPs
arguably is not a form of state action and therefore does not invoke Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. See generally Nancy Kamp, Gender Discrimination at Pri-
vate Golf Clubs, 5 SPORTS LAw. J. 89, 92 (1998)(citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883)).
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protection for women, those protections do not reach as far as one
might think.
Over the years, the United States Congress has provided various
forms of protection from discrimination. In 1964, Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, or national origin.35 Unfortunately, Title II of the Act, which
prohibits racial discrimination in places of public accommodation, did
not include sex as a protected class and thus does not provide women
with federal protection from discrimination in places of public accom-
modation.36
Although Congress neglected the protection of women in places of
public accommodation, it did eventually act to protect women from
discrimination in many other areas, demonstrating a commitment to
equal rights for women regardless of their unique sex-based characteris-
tics. Congress prohibited sex discrimination in employment when it
enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.37 It then granted women pro-
tection from discrimination in education in 1972 when it enacted Title
IX.38 Additionally, in 1978, Congress amended Title VII to protect
women from sex discrimination in employment by defining "because of
sex" and "on the basis of sex" to include pregnancy and pregnancy-
35. The Civil Rights Act provides: "All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommoda-
tions of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national ori-
gin." 42 U.S.C. 2000a(a).
36. See id.
37. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. Specifically, § 2000e-2 requires equal employ-
ment opportunities:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2. Ironically, sex was added as a protected class in the employment dis-
crimination law by a southern conservative congressman in an attempt to derail the
bill. See John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An
Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1337, 1337 (1989).
38. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000). Title IX provides equal opportunity to women
in education programs and activities, including sports activities. Id. § 1661.
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related conditions. 9 Federal courts have interpreted this amendment,
known as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), to include protec-
tion from discrimination in employment when an employee has the
"ability to become pregnant."0 Moreover, federal courts have found that
failure to provide coverage for contraceptives in employee health plans,
when those plans are otherwise comprehensive is sex discrimination.4"
Despite the fact that sex remains an unprotected class in public ac-
commodations under Title II of the Civil Rights Act, protection of
women from discrimination has evolved to become a core concern of
discrimination law. This is supported by the fact that forty-five states in
the United States have included sex in their public accommodation stat-
utes.42 Accordingly, although women who face discrimination in
39. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42
U.S.C. 2000e(k) (2000)). The Act reads:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or re-
lated medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit pro-
grams, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work ....
Id.
40. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991).
41. See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D. Wash. 2001); but see In
re Union Pac. R.R. Empl. Practices Litig., No. 06-1706, 2007 WL 763842 (8th Cir.
Mar. 15, 2007) (holding that an employer health plan that specifically excluded cov-
erage of prescription contraceptives was not discriminatory despite the fact that only
women are affected by pregnancy).
42. Charles P. Charpentier, Comments: An Unimproved Lie: Gender discrimination con-
tinues at Augusta National Golf Club, 11 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 111, 123 n.89
(2004) (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.80.200, .80.230, .80.300 (Michie 2000); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-123-101 to -108 (Michie Supp. 2003); CAL. CiV. CODE § 51
(West 1982 & Supp. 2003); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-34-601 (2002); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 4 6a-6 3 to -64 (West 1995 & Supp. 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§§ 4501-4516 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 509.092-.141 (West 2002); HAw. REV.
STAT. §§ 489-1 to -8 (1993 Supp. 2001); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7301 to -7303 (Michie
1997 & Supp. 2003); 775 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/5-103(A) (West 2001 & Supp.
2002); IND. CODE §§ 22-9-1-1 to -18, -9-1-3 (1991 & Supp. 2002); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 216.1-.20 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003; KA. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1001, -1002,
-1009 (2000); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.145 (Michie 1997); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 49:146 (West 2003); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4551-4553, 4591 (West
2002 & Supp. 2002); MD. CODE ANN. art. 49B, § 5 (1957 & Supp. 2002); MAss.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West 2000 & Supp. 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 37.2301-.2303 (2001 & Supp. 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01-.03 (West
1991 & Supp. 2003); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 213.010, .065 (1996 & Supp. 2003);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1-201, -2-101, -2-304 (2001); NEB. Rav. STAT. §§ 20-132
2007]
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pharmacies on the basis of their sex have no claim under existing federal
statutes, they are likely to have an actionable claim under state law if
they live in one of the forty-five states with statutory protections for
women from discrimination in places of public accommodation. Al-
though this Article uses Washington law as a model, it is important to
note that the analysis set forth below is transferable among the forty-five
states that have enacted similar public accommodation statutes that pro-
tect women from sex discrimination.
B. The Washington Law Against Discrimination Protects Women
ftom Discrimination in Places of Public Accommodation
The WLAD was originally enacted in 1949 as a law prohibiting
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, creed, color or na-
tional origin." In 1957, the scope of the law was expanded to protect
people from discrimination in places of public resort, accommodation
or amusement. 44 The law was again amended in 1973 to expand protec-
tions against discrimination in credit and insurance transactions, as well
as to protect people from discrimination on the basis of sex, marital
status, age and disability.5 As currently enacted, the purpose of the
WLAD is much broader, and provides far greater protections, than the
46Federal Civil Rights Act.
to -143 (1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§354-A:2, -A:16-:17 (1995 & Supp.
2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:1-3 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. %§ 28-1-2, -1-7
(Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c (McKinney 2001 &
Supp. 2003); N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 291, 292, 296 (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2003);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-14-04, 14-02.4-01-.4-02, 14-02.4-14, 14-02.4-16 (1997
& Supp. 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. %§ 4112.01-.02 (West 2001 & Supp. 2002;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 1401, 1402 (West 1987 & Supp. 2003); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 659A.400-.409 (2001); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(i) (Purdon 2002 &
Supp. 2003); R.I. GEN. LAws 11-24-1 to -3.1 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ -13-
1, 20-13-23 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-501 to -503
(1998 & Supp. 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-1 to -4 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, §§ 4500-4502 (1993 & Supp. 2002); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.010,
.60.030, .60.040, .60.215 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003); W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-2 to -
4, 5-11-9 (2002 & Supp. 2003); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-9-101 to -102 (Michie
2003)); Amz. REv. STAT. § 41-1442 (2002); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402-31 (1977);
NEV. REv. STAT. 233.010 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900 (Michie 2001); Wis.
STAT. § 106.52 (2005).
43. Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order
of Eagles, 59 P.3d 655 (Wash. 2002).
44. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 59 P.3d at 666.
45. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 (West 2002).
46. See id., which states:
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In Washington, the right to be free from discrimination extends to
"full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or
privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or
amusement., 7 First, "full enjoyment" has been defined to include the
right to purchase any service or commodity without directly or indirectly
causing persons of any sex to be treated as "not welcome, accepted, de-
sired, or solicited."" Second, "place of public accommodation" has been
defined to include "any place, licensed or unlicensed, kept for gain, hire or
reward, or ... for the benefit, use, or accommodation of those seeking
health, ... or for the sale of goods, merchandise, services, or personal
property, or for the rendering of personal services.""
The WLAD established the Human Rights Commission (HRC) and
gives that agency "powers with respect to elimination and prevention of
discrimination" in employment and in other specified areas,5" as well as
the power to investigate and rule on complaints alleging unfair practices
as defined in the statute." The HRC also has the power to promulgate
regulations in order to carry out the purposes of the statute.12
Within the public accommodation context, the HRC has adopted
regulations under the WLAD related to disability discrimination, but not
yet to any other form of discrimination in places of public accommoda-
tion.53 However, in 1999 the HRC promulgated regulations pertaining to
sex discrimination in the employment context.54 Specifically, those regula-
tions prohibit discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and pregnancy-
related conditions including the potential to become pregnant."
This chapter shall be known as the "law against discrimination". It is an
exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of the public
welfare, health, and peace of the people of this state, and in fulfillment of
the provisions of the Constitution of this state concerning civil rights. The
legislature hereby finds and declares that practices of discrimination against
any of its inhabitants because of race, creed, color, national origin, families
with children, sex, marital status, age, or the presence of any sensory, men-
tal, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal
by a disabled person are a matter of state concern, that such discrimination
threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but
menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state.
47. Id. § 49.60.030(1)(b).
48. Id. § 49.60.040(9).
49. Id. § 49.60.040(10).
50. Id. 49.60.050-.60.140
51. Id. § 49.60.120(4).
52. Id. § 49.60.120(3).
53. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 162-26 (2003).
54. Id. 162-30-010 to -020.
55. Id. 162-30-020 (2005).
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The fact that the HRC has not promulgated any regulations related
to sex discrimination in places of public accommodation does not indi-
cate that it does not intend to protect women from discrimination in that
context. More likely, the absence of regulation in that area is a result of a
lack of complaints filed with the HRC. Out of a total of 1066 complaints
filed, the HRC received only seventy-two complaints based on discrimi-
nation in a place of public accommodation during the 2002-2003 fiscal
year." Of those seventy-two complaints, 62.5% were complaints of dis-
crimination because of race. Complaints of sex discrimination in a place
of public accommodation were apparently so few that the number did not
merit a mention in the Human Rights Commission Fact Sheet.57
The HRC is not the only avenue a victim of discrimination might
use to seek a remedy. The WLAD recognizes that the right to be free from
discrimination is a civil right enforceable by private civil actions.58 Indeed,
Washington courts have long recognized that damage is inherent in a dis-
criminatory act. "The act alleged in itself carries with it the elements of an
assault upon the person, and in such cases the personal indignity inflicted,
the feeling of humiliation and disgrace engendered, and the consequent
mental suffering, are elements of actual damages for which a compensa-
tory award may be made."59 Additionally, because "the remedial provision
of law against discrimination is to be liberally construed in order to en-
courage private enforcement,"6 ° a woman who feels that she has been
discriminated against could file a claim against the alleged offender under
the statute.
1. Refusal to Fill Prescriptions for Pregnancy Related Drugs is
Discrimination Based on Sex: The Prima Facie Case for
Sex Discrimination in Places of Public Accommodation
Washington courts have developed the requirements for a prima fa-
cie case of discrimination in places of public accommodation under the
WILAD as it applies in the contexts of disability and racial discrimina-
tion.61 However, as for sex discrimination claims, the two cases on point
56. Washington State Human Rights Commission Fact Sheet, July 1, 2002-June 30,
2003 (2004), http://www.hum.wa.gov/documents/JeanFactSheet02-03.pdf.
57. See id.
58. WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.030(2) (2003).
59. Negron v. Snoqualmie Valley Hosp., 936 P.2d 55, 60 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (citing
Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co., 114 Wash. 24, 31, 194 P. 813 (1921)).
60. Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese of Seattle, 829 P.2d 196, 197 (Wash. Ct. App.
1992).
61. See generally Fell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 911 P.2d 1319 (Wash. 1996).
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give an analysis of comparability of treatment 62 and an analysis of what
constitutes a place of a public accommodation. 3 While these two cases
are instructive, neither sets out a clear test for analyzing sex discrimina-
tion in places of public accommodation under the WLAD.
In Fell v. Spokane Transit Authority, the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton faced an issue of first impression in determining whether disability
discrimination had occurred." In its analysis and creation of a test for
disability discrimination, the court borrowed heavily from federal treat-
ment of the disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
65
and also from Washington case law within the context of employment
discrimination against persons with disabilities.66 The court crafted a
four-part test to determine whether there is a prima facie case for dis-
ability discrimination in places of public accommodation: (1) plaintiff
has a disability recognized under the statute; (2) the defendant's business
or establishment is a place of public accommodation; (3) plaintiff was
discriminated against by receiving treatment that was not comparable to
the level of designated services provided to individuals without disabili-
ties by or at the place of public accommodation; and (4) the disability
67
was a substantial factor causing the discrimination.
Similarly, in Demelash v. Ross, the Court of Appeals of Washington
noted that the necessary elements of a prima facie showing of
race/national origin discrimination had not been established by Wash-
ington courts.6 Accordingly, it examined the elements established in Fell
for a disability-discrimination case and held that similar elements are
required in the race and national origin context. 69 For claims of
race/national origin discrimination in public accommodation, the ele-
ments that must be shown are: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a
protected class; (2) the defendant's establishment is a place of public ac-
commodation; (3) the defendant discriminated against plaintiff by not
treating the plaintiff in a manner comparable to the treatment it pro-
vides to persons outside that class; and (4) the protected status was a
substantial factor causing the discrimination.
62. MacLean v. First Nw. Indus. of Am., Inc., 635 P.2d 683, 684 (Wash. 1981).
63. Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order
of Eagles, 59 P.3d 655, 668 (Wash. 2002).
64. Fell, 911 P.2d at 1321.
65. Fell, 911 P.2d at 1324.
66. Fell, 911 P.2d at 1326.
67. Fell, 911 P.2d at 1328.
68. Demelash v. Ross Stores, Inc., 20 P.3d 447, 456 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
69. Demelash, 20 P.3d at 456.
70. Demelash, 20 P.3d at 456.
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Although the Washington courts have not set out a specific test for
sex discrimination in places of public accommodation, it is logical to use
an analogous test for sex discrimination in places of public accommoda-
tion for several reasons. First, the WLAD has a broad purpose to
eliminate all forms of discrimination. Accordingly, absent distinguishing
factors, the various protected classes should be treated similarly under
the law. Second, the analysis used in MacLean runs parallel to the test
later elucidated in Fell and Demelash, in that MacLean examined the
absence of classification based solely on sex, the purpose of the classifica-
tion, and the effects of the classification to determine whether the
classification is valid.71 Accordingly, it is evident that the analysis is ap-
plicable and that it has simply not yet been utilized. Third, use of such
an analogous test bolsters consistency and judicial efficiency within
Washington courts.
This Article will now address each of the elements of a prima facie
case in turn to explain how women facing pharmacist refusals to dis-
pense emergency contraception will pursue a claim for sex
discrimination in a place of public accommodation.
2. Discrimination on the Basis of Membership in a Protected Class:
Discrimination Based on the Potential to Become Pregnant Is
Discrimination Based on Sex
a. Utilizing Federal Employment Law in the
Absence of State Precedent
There is little Washington case law on the matter of sex discrimina-
tion in places of public accommodation. 2 As a result, there is little
guidance regarding what constitutes sex discrimination absent a facially
discriminatory practice of excluding women.7" Where there has been an
71. See MacLean, 635 P.2d at 684; Fell, 911 P.2d at 1324; Demelash, 20 P.3d at 456.
72. Relevant cases include Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand
Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 59 P.3d 655 (Wash. 2002) and MacLean, 635
P.2d 683 (further discussed infra notes 78-79, 119-125 and accompanying text.
Neither case sets out criteria for establishment of a classification based on sex. How-
ever, some guidance is given in MacLean, where the Washington Supreme Court held
that where price differentials are constructed to benefit several categories of people
including women, seniors, children, and military personnel, the classification of
prices is not based solely on sex. MacLean, 635 P.2d at 684. But cf Fraternal Order of
Eagles, 59 P.3d at 672 (finding sex discrimination when the club was not "distinctly
private" as was required to be exempted from WLAD).
73. In Fraternal Order of Eagles, a club had a policy of admitting only men and specifi-
cally refused to grant admission to women. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 59 P.3d at 658.
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absence of established state discrimination law, Washington courts have
borrowed heavily from state and federal employment law.74
Women in the state of Washington are protected from sex dis-
crimination in the workplace by the WLAD75 Additionally, the
Washington HRC promulgated regulations defining sex-based discrimi-
nation in the workplace to include pregnancy and the potential to
become pregnant." While there is no state case law interpreting this
regulation, the regulation is directly analogous in its word and its pur-
pose to the PDA.77 Granted, the PDA prohibits discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy in employment rather than in places of public ac-
commodation. However, the PDA and the federal case law interpreting
it are relevant and should be applied in the public accommodation con-
text for several reasons.
First, despite limited case law applicable to sex discrimination in
places of public accommodation, Washington's public policy prohibiting
discrimination is very broad.78 Specifically, the Washington Supreme
Court has said that the WLAD "is a broad remedial statute, the purpose
of which is to prevent and eradicate discrimination on the basis of race,
creed, color, national origin, sex or disability in 'public accommoda-
tions.' ,7' Additionally, the court has noted that the WLAD is broader
than Title VII and grants more protections than does Title VII: "Unlike
our state law against discrimination, Title VII is limited to employment
discrimination. Unlike our state law against discrimination, Title VII
does not contain a broad statement of the right to be free of discrimina-
tion in other areas. Our state law does."80
Because the state statute is so broad and does not limit its applica-
tion to what is specifically listed, courts should feel comfortable
extending the federal employment discrimination principles of the PDA
to the context of public accommodation.
Secondly, when lacking relevant case law, Washington courts have
often looked to state and federal employment discrimination law for
But cf MacLean, 635 P.2d 683 (holding that price differentials do not constitute sex
discrimination where such differentials benefit several categories of people).
74. Fell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 911 P.2d 1319, 1327-28 (Wash. 1996); Lewis v.
Doll, 765 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
75. WASH. Rav. CODE § 49.60.180 (2002).
76. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 162-30-020 (2003).
77. Compare WASH. ADMIN. CODE 162-30-020 (2003) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(2000).
78. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 59 P.3d at 667.
79. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 59 P.3d at 661.
80. Marquis v. City of Spokane, 922 P.2d 43, 50 (Wash. 1996).
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guidance in public accommodation cases.81 For example, in the context
of disability discrimination, Washington courts have extended employ-
ment law analysis and principles of the federal ADA to state claims of
disability discrimination in places of public accommodation.82 More-
over, when interpreting the WLAD provisions related to disability
discrimination, the Supreme Court of Washington looked specifically to
the federal ADA.83 Because courts have extended federal employment
discrimination analysis to public accommodation law in the context of
disability discrimination, courts should feel equally comfortable making
the same extension in the context of sex discrimination.
Finally, while there is no federal law governing discrimination
against women in places of public accommodation, there is a body of
existing law based on the PDA. Moreover, Washington State has enacted
regulations that mirror the PDA, making its application in the absence
of law all the more appropriate. In the absence of guidance from existing
case law, Washington courts should extend existing law based on the
PDA to a state claim of sex discrimination in a place of public accom-
modation. Such an extension will maintain consistency with previous
judicial reasoning. Accordingly, federal law interpreting the PDA will
give the most analogous and persuasive authority.
b. Evolution of Pregnancy-Based Discrimination Analysis
Because federal law interpreting the PDA provides the most rele-
vant and persuasive authority, it is important to understand the history
and evolution of the analysis that is so appropriate today. In 1976, the
U.S. Supreme Court examined the application of Title VII to preg-
nancy-related conditions when it decided General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert.84 In Gilbert, the Court held that an otherwise-comprehensive
short-term disability policy that did not cover pregnancy-related dis-
abilities did not discriminate on the basis of sex.85 The majority reasoned
that pregnancy discrimination does not adversely impact all women and
therefore is not the same as gender discrimination.86 Additionally, the
Court reasoned that no benefits were provided to men that were not also
provided to women. The fact that pregnancy disabilities were an uncov-
81. See Fell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 911 P.2d 1319, 1327-28 (Wash. 1996); Demelash
v. Ross Stores, Inc., 20 P.3d 447, 456 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
82. SeeFell, 911 P.2dat 1326.
83. McClarty v. Totem Elec., 137 P.3d 844, 851 (Wash. 2006).
84. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
85. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145-46.
86. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138-40.
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ered risk unique to women did not destroy the facial disparity of the
87
coverage.
The dissenting justices in Gilbert argued that because only women
are able to become pregnant, they were being subjected to unlawful dis-
crimination on the basis of their sex. The dissent also asserted that the
proper analysis requires examination of the comprehensiveness of the
coverage provided to each sex.88 Accordingly, Justice Brennan noted that
it was facially discriminatory for an employer to provide a benefits pol-
icy that "but for pregnancy, offers protection for all risks, even those that
are 'unique to' men or heavily male dominated.. '.9
In response, Congress amended Title VII to explicitly overrule Gil-
bert and to protect women from discrimination on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related conditions, and thus enacted the PDA.9° Proponents
of the bill expressed the necessity of clarifying the congressional intent of
Tide VII and endorsed the views of the dissenting Justices in Gilbert.9'
87. Recently, in In re Union Pacific, No. 06-1706, 2007 WL 763842 (8th Cir. Mar. 15,
2007), the court of appeals adopted this outdated Gilbert reasoning that was specifi-
cally rejected by Congress. Dismissing the fact that men are not capable of becoming
pregnant, the court held that where a health plan does not cover contraception for
men or for women, the plan does not discriminate on the basis of sex. In re Union
Pacific, 2007 WL 763842, at *5. The court explained that the proper comparator is
the provision of the medical benefits. In re Union Pacific, 2007 WL 763842, at *5.
Since the plan does not cover contraceptives for men, failure to provide coverage for
women does not constitute discrimination. Additionally, the court of appeals asserts
that because contraceptives are only indicated prior to pregnancy, their use is gender
neutral, similar to infertility treatment. In re Union Pacific, 2007 WL 763842, at *3.
This reasoning is questionable in light of the fact that the PDA was enacted to clarify
Title VII rather than to add additional rights. See infra note 90).
88. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)).
91. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 679 n.17
(1983) (citing S. Rep. No 95-311, pp 7-8 (1977) ("the bill is merely reestablishing
the law as it was understood prior to Gilbert by the EEOC and by the lower
courts")); H. R. Rep. No. 95-948; 123 Cong. Rec. 10581 (1977) (remarks of Rep.
Hawkins) ("H. R. 5055 does not really add anything to title VII as I and, I believe,
most of my colleagues in Congress when title VII was enacted in 1964 and amended
in 1972, understood the prohibition against sex discrimination in employment. For,
it seems only common sense, that since only women can become pregnant, discrimi-
nation against pregnant people is necessarily discrimination against women, and that
forbidding discrimination based on sex therefore clearly forbids discrimination based
on pregnancy"); id. at 29387 (remarks of Sen. Javits) ("this bill is simply corrective
legislation, designed to restore the law with respect to pregnant women employees to
the point where it was last year, before the Supreme Court's decision in Gilbert . ..);
id. at 29647; id. at 29655 (remarks of Sen. Javits) ("What we are doing is leaving the
situation the way it was before the Supreme Court decided the Gilbert case last
20071
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After the passage of the PDA, the United States Supreme Court recon-
sidered the issue in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC.92 In that case, the Court examined an employee health plan that
provided comprehensive hospitalization benefits to both male and fe-
male employees and their dependent spouses.9' The one discrepancy in
benefits was a limitation on coverage for pregnancy-related hospitaliza-
tion for the wives of male employees. 94 The Court acknowledged that
the PDA "makes clear that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related
conditions less favorably than other medical conditions."" It then held
the employee benefits plan to be unlawful sex discrimination based on a
two-part analysis under which the Court ultimately held that "discrimi-
nation based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination
because of her sex."9 6 This holding was a broad interpretation of the
PDA in that the Court applied the PDA to both male and female em-
ployees. Most importantly, the Court emphasized the intent of Congress
to override the analysis used in Gilbert and to firmly establish that dis-
crimination on the basis of pregnancy or related conditions is sex
discrimination on its face.
After the U.S. Supreme Court firmly established in Newport News
that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is sex discrimination, it
again elaborated on the application of the PDA in UAW v. Johnson Con-
trol. 97 In that case, an employer's policy prohibiting fertile female
employees from working in jobs that involved exposure to lead at a level
exceeding Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards
was found to be facially discriminatory against women.98 Specifically, the
year"); 124 Cong. Rec. 21436 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Sarasin) ("This bill would re-
store the interpretation of title VII prior to that decision"). For statements expressly
approving the views of the dissenting Justices that pregnancy discrimination is dis-
crimination on the basis of sex, see Leg. Hist., at 18 (remarks of Sen. Bayh, Mar. 18,
1977, 123 Cong. Rec. 8144); 24 (remarks of Rep. Hawkins, Apr. 5, 1977, 123
Cong. Rec. 10582); 67 (remarks of Sen. Javits, Sept. 15, 1977, 123 Cong. Rec.
29387); 73 (remarks of Sen. Bayh, Sept. 16, 1977, 123 Cong. Rec. 29641); 134 (re-
marks of Sen. Mathias, Sept. 16, 1977, 123 Cong. Rec. 29663-29664); 168
(remarks of Rep. Sarasin, July 18, 1978, 124 Cong. Rec. 21436). See also Discrimina-
tion on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977, Hearings on S. 995 before the Subcommittee
on Labor of the Senate Committee on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 13
(1977) (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 37, 51 (statement of Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for Civil Rights Drew S. Days).
92. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 679.
93. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 671-72.
94. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 672.
95. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684.
96. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684.
97. UAWv. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
98. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 211.
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Court found that the policy classified its employees on the basis of their
"potential for pregnancy" and that under the PDA, "such a classification
must be regarded ... in the same light as explicit sex discrimination."99
Moreover, the Court went on to emphasize the right of women to be
free in their own personal decisions about reproduction: "Decisions
about the welfare of future children must be left to the parents who con-
ceive, bear, support, and raise them rather than to the employers who
hire those parents. Congress had mandated this choice . . . .""o Because
discrimination on the basis of a person's potential to become pregnant is
facial sex discrimination, it follows that discrimination on the basis of
contraceptive use is also discriminatory. Indeed, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and federal courts went on to make
such findings.
In 2000, the EEOC issued a policy decision interpreting the PDA as
it applies to contraceptive coverage provided in employee health benefits
plans.10 ' The decision arose out of a claim of sex discrimination where an
employee health plan provided coverage for a broad range of services and
prescription drugs but excluded coverage for prescription contraceptives
whether for contraceptive or other medical purposes. 102 The EEOC con-
cluded that exclusion of contraception from the plan violates Title VII
as amended by the PDA. Central to the EEOC's reasoning was the fact
that the courts have acknowledged that the PDA prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of a woman's potential for pregnancy as well as
pregnancy itself.' °3 The fact that it is only "women, rather than men,
who have the ability to become pregnant cannot be used to penalize
them in any way" led the EEOC to conclude that discrimination on the
basis of a woman's use of contraceptives is included in the prohibitions
of the PDA.104 Simply put, because prescription contraceptives are avail-
able only to women, treating contraceptive use differently from the use
99. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 199.
100. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 206; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
101. Decision on Coverage of Contraception (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n Dec. 14, 2000) (Commission Decision), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
decisions-contraception.html.
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991)).
104. Id. Moreover, the Commission emphasized the PDA's explicit exception for employ-
ers from requiring coverage for abortion. Id. The Commission reasoned that
Congress understood that contraception would be included in the protections of the
act absent an explicit exemption. Id.
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of any other prescription drug is sex discrimination on its face and is
prohibited by the PDA.
In the landmark case Erickson v. Bartell Drug Company, a U.S. dis-
trict court addressed whether an otherwise-comprehensive employee
health plan failing to cover contraceptives was discriminatory on the
basis of sex. °5 The court explained that proper analysis requires recogni-
tion of the fact that males and females have different, sex-based
healthcare needs, and those needs must be met to the same extent and
on the same terms. 0 6 The court found that because contraception is ba-
sic health care for women vital to their physical, emotional, economic,
and social well-being, its exclusion from an otherwise comprehensive
health plan constituted sex discrimination. 17 Following the reasoning in
the Gilbert dissent, Newport News, and Johnson Controls, the court de-
termined that "Tide VII requires employers to recognize the difference
in the sexes and provide equally comprehensive coverage" to each. 10
Case law has established that discrimination based on the capacity
to become pregnant is sex discrimination on its face. Moreover, dis-
crimination based on use of contraceptives constitutes such pregnancy-
related sex discrimination. Accordingly, the appropriate classification of
people facing discrimination in the case of a pharmacist refusing to fill
prescriptions for emergency contraception is women. To be sure, it is
not those who present prescriptions for contraception contrasted against
those who present prescriptions for other drugs. This analysis, under
which men are not granted access to any drug that women are denied,
was explicitly rejected in the employment context by the passage of the
PDA and then again by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Newport News.1"9 The appropriate analysis takes into account men's and
women's unique sex-based characteristics and health care needs which
must be met equally.
In the context of employment discrimination law, failure to provide
coverage for contraceptives in an otherwise comprehensive health plan is
sex discrimination. Where an employer provides coverage for a broad
range of drugs and care for men, yet excludes coverage for contracep-
tion, the employer is denying women access to the basic health care
need of preventing pregnancy while men maintain comprehensive pre-
105. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001). But
Cf In re Union Pacific R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D.
Neb. 2005).
106. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
107. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1273.
108. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1277.
109. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983).
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ventative coverage. Coverage for contraception in an employee health
plan is little reassurance if women may be discriminated against when
they walk into a pharmacy.
If we apply these principles to the public accommodation context,
refusal to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception is clearly sex
discrimination. Using a similar analysis, we see that women need emer-
gency contraception as a function of their unique ability to become
pregnant. Because only women face the serious risk of becoming preg-
nant, refusal to dispense ECPs and thus refusal to provide basic vital
preventative care results in sex-based discrimination. That is, women are
denied access to a basic health care necessity while men are granted full
access to all basic health care drugs.
3. Places of Public Accommodation: Pharmacies are
Places of Public Accommodation
Revised Code of Washington defines places of public accommoda-
tion and makes clear that the statute extends to places and facilities
including any place for the benefit of those seeking health or the sale of
goods or services."O While the definition of a place of public accommo-
dation does not include broad geographical areas where general services
such as public transportation are provided, case law has established a
broad range of business establishments that do fall within the reach of
the statute."' Locations including restaurants, parks, public resorts, hos-
pitals, and retail outlets are all established places of public
accommodation. 12 The primary exception within the statute defining a
place of public accommodation protects distinctly private clubs." 3
110. WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.040(10) (2002).
111. Fell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 911 P.2d 1319 (Wash. 1996) (holding that public
transportation services are not a place of public accommodation).
112. Locations that have been held to constitute places of public accommodation include
restaurants (Powell v. Utz, 87 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Wash. 1949)), parks and public
resorts (Davis v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 77 P. 209 (Wash. 1904)), movie theaters
(Anderson v. Pantages Theater Co., 194 P. 813 (Wash. 1921)), Randall v. Cowlitz
Amusements, Inc., 76 P.2d 1017 (Wash. 1938)), a weight control clinic (Browning
v. Slenderella Sys. of Seattle, 341 P.2d 859 (Wash. 1959)), and barbershops (In re
Johnson, 427 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1967)). Additionally, places such as hospitals and
retail outlets have conceded their status as places of public accommodation. E.g.,
Demelash v. Ross Stores, Inc., 20 P.3d 447 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); Negron v.
Snoqualmie Valley Hosp., 936 P.2d 55 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
113. WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.040(10) (2002); see also Fraternal Order of Eagles, Te-
nino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 59 P.3d 655 (Wash.
2002).
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Because pharmacies are open to the public, conduct commercial busi-
ness, and are heavily regulated by the state, a pharmacy cannot argue
with any force that it is not a place of public accommodation or that it
falls within the private club exception.
4. Comparability of Services: Refusal to Fill a Lawful Prescription
Alienates Women and Fails to Provide a Comparable Level of Service
The legislature designed the WLAD to prevent discrimination in a
variety of fields as a means of removing barriers to equal opportunity in
Washington. 114 Accordingly, because the prohibition on discrimination
stems from the constitutional requirement for equal protection, the Su-
preme Court of Washington has held that an essential element of
discrimination in the public accommodation statute is discrimination
evidenced when members of a protected class are denied comparable
services."'
While there is little case law consistently describing what consti-
tutes comparable services, Washington courts have examined both the
actual level of services provided to patrons as well as the manner in
which patrons are treated or made to feel.1 6 For example, the court in
Fell found that fixed routes of a public transportation authority provided
a comparable level of service to patrons regardless of their disability.17
Likewise, in the context of Title VII employment discrimination, the
Supreme Court found sex-based discrimination in Newport News when a
disparity existed between the overall comprehensiveness of the benefits
offered to the male employees and the comprehensiveness of the benefits
offered to the female employees."
8
In our case, a woman wishing to have a prescription for emergency
contraception filled is seeking access to a basic health care need. She
goes to a pharmacy where a wide range of drugs is available with the
presentation of a lawful prescription. If she presents a prescription for an
antibiotic, a cholesterol medication, or a pain management drug, she
will not be turned away. However, in her case, she holds a prescription
that may not be filled because it is one to which the pharmacist objects.
114. Fell, 911 P.2d at 1325.
115. Fell, 911 P.2d at 1327. While the court applied this analysis in the context of dis-
ability discrimination, it noted that the comparability element has been applied to
other kinds of discrimination including race and gender discrimination. Id. at 1328.
116. See MacLean v. First Nw. Indus. of Am., Inc., 635 P.2d 683, 684-86 (Wash. 1981).
117. Fell, 911 P.2d at 1329-30.
118. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983);
see also supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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These drugs are the only class of drugs that the pharmacist refuses to
provide. Moreover, this class of drugs affects only the health and welfare
of women. This refusal to provide service and care is discrimination on
the basis of the patient's potential to become pregnant and thus is dis-
crimination on the basis of sex.
When considering public accommodation claims, Washington
courts have often examined whether the alleged discriminatory act made
the plaintiff feel unwanted, unwelcome, or unsolicited.119 For example,
in MacLean, different prices were charged to male and female patrons of
a basketball game in conducting "ladies' night".120 The Washington Su-
preme Court found that comparable services were provided despite the
differential pricing charged to opposite sexes.121 It examined the lan-
guage of the WLAD 122 and reasoned that because the higher ticket prices
for male patrons were not calculated to, nor did they cause, the patrons
to feel "unwelcome, unaccepted, undesired or unsolicited," no discrimi-
nation had occurred.
1 23
The court explained that behavior that results in making a classified
person feel unwelcome is precisely what characterizes discrimination in
places of public accommodation. 124 It suggested that unwelcoming con-
duct, such as denying access as in Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co., is
unacceptable.1 25 In that case, a black man acquired tickets for box seats
in a theater and was subsequently denied access to those seats and made
to feel unwelcome in the theater. 12 The MacLean court indicated that
conduct resulting in patrons feeling unwelcome, unaccepted or unenti-
tled to service that other patrons receive is the very type of behavior that
the statute was meant to prevent.
127
It is worth noting that courts in other jurisdictions have applied a
similar analysis to examine whether patrons felt discouraged, unwelcome,
119. Eg., MacLean, 635 P.2d at 686.
120. MacLean, 635 P.2d at 684.
121. See MacLean, 635 P.2d at 684-85.
122. MacLean, 635 P.2d at 685 (citing WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.040(9) (2002)).
123. MacLean, 635 P.2d at 686.
124. MacLean, 635 P.2d at 686. The Court of Appeals of Washington expanded on this
principle in Evergreen School District No. 144 v. Washington State Human Rights
Commission, 695 P.2d 999 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985). The court noted that while sub-
jective feelings of the plaintiff cannot be the basis for a claim of discrimination, they
are illustrative when coupled with unequal treatment. Evergreen School District, 695
P.2d at 1004.
125. MacLean, 635 P.2d at 686 (citing Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co., 194 P. 813
(Wash. 1921)).
126. Anderson, 194 P. at 814.
127. See MacLean, 635 P.2d at 686.
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unacceptable or unsolicited in determining whether someone was de-
nied full enjoyment of a place of public accommodation. 128 The
opinions of these courts are consistent with the notion that a refusal of
service, rather than a mere difference in prices for different sexes, would
violate state public accommodation statutes.129
A woman who is refused service at a pharmacy because of her sex-
based health care needs is receiving a sub-standard level of care. While
she would be served without question upon presentation of any other
lawful prescription or request for over-the-counter medication, her
need for medication to prevent pregnancy is treated as undeserving of
professional respect. Refusal of service will necessarily result in the pa-
tron feeling unwanted and unsolicited. Furthermore, when a pharmacist
looks a patient in the eye and tells the patient that he or she holds a
moral objection to fulfilling her basic health need, the patient will not
only feel unsolicited, but judged and condemned by the pharmacist
upon whom she relies for help.
In sum, a pharmacist who refuses service to patients in need of
pregnancy prevention care is not providing a comparable level of service
to those patients. Moreover, the refusal will result in the patient feeling
unwanted, undesired and unsolicited. Unequal treatment which, by its
very nature causes a patron to feel unwelcome and unsolicited, rises to
the level of behavior that is unacceptable under the WLAD.
5. Substantial Factor: Refusal to Fill Prescriptions for Emergency
Contraception Results in Sex Discrimination
Finally, the Washington Supreme Court has held that the proper
causation test for disability discrimination in places of public accommo-
dation is that the alleged unfair practice was a substantial factor in
producing the alleged discrimination. "0 While this element appears to
128. See, e.g., Dock Club, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 428 N.E.2d 735, 738
(Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (noting that if higher prices charged to male customers had been
exacted for the purpose of discouraging them from patronizing the establishment, or
if it had that effect, it would have denied them the equal enjoyment of the facilities in
violation of the law); Tucich v. Dearborn Indoor Racquet Club, 309 N.W.2d 615,
619 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that price differentials did violate the public ac-
commodations statute where there was no statement or implication that any
particular sex was not acceptable, welcome, or solicited).
129. See also Magid v. Oak Park Racquet Club Assoc., Ltd., 269 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1978) (holding that price differentials did not violate public accommoda-
tion statute absent a direct or indirect refusal, withholding, or denial of services).
130. Fell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 911 P.2d 1319, 1330 (Wash. 1996) (citing Finnessey
v. Seattle Baseball Club, 210 P. 679 (Wash. 1922) (finding that plaintiff allegedly ex-
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require an examination of the intent of the defendant, the court has
made clear that it does not require a showing of intent. "' Specifically,
the "test for discrimination requires only that the alleged discrimination
result from something the defendant has done, and not from some other
cause. This is a reflection of the necessity for establishing proximate
cause, and has nothing to do with the subjective intent of the defen-
dant.'
132
Moreover, the Court of Appeals of Washington examined the futil-
ity of making an inquiry into intent in the presence of a discriminatory
impact. Citing to Robinson v. 12 Lofts Reality, Inc., the Court of Appeals
of Washington explained that when a discriminatory effect is present,
the courts "must be alert to recognize means that are subtle and explana-
tions that are synthetic." 3 3 Additionally, courts have noted that
discrimination "may arise just as surely through 'subtleties of conduct"'
as through an openly-expressed refusal to serve.131
In the case of a refusal to fill a prescription for emergency contra-
ception, the refusal of service to all persons capable of becoming
pregnant is a refusal constituting sex discrimination. Moreover, the sub-
jective intent of the pharmacist is not at issue. Regardless of the
pharmacist's subjective intent, an overt denial of care and the creation of
a barrier to care for women produces a discriminatory effect.
cluded from a ball park on the basis of race was actually excluded because he had
fixed the outcome of games); Klein v. Boeing Co., 847 F. Supp. 838 (W.D. Wash.
1994) (finding that employee was discharged, not because of his mental condition,
but based on employer's policy allowing for termination of employees convicted of
crimes); Chadwick v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 667 P.2d 1104 (Wash. 1983) (finding
that chronic absenteeism and unsatisfactory work, rather than handicap, resulted in
discharge)).
131. Fell, 911 P.2d at 1331 n.30.
132. Fell, 911 P.2d at 1331 n.30.
133. Lewis v. Doll, 765 P.2d 1341, 1346 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989)(citing Robinson v. 12
Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2nd Cit. 1979)).
134. Negron v. Snoqualmie Valley Hosp., 936 P.2d 55, 60 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (citing
Browning v. Slenderella Sys. of Seattle, 341 P.2d 859, 862 (Wash. 1959)), overruled
on other grounds by Nord v. Shoreline Savings Ass'n, 805 P.2d 800, 804 (Wash.
1991).
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III. ARGUMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT PHARMACIST
A. Plaintiff Has not Met Her Prima Facie Case Because She
has Failed to Show Discrimination on the Basis of Sex
A defendant pharmacist is most likely to assert that a plaintiff has
failed to make a prima facie case and will assert that the plaintiff has
failed to show that she is a member of a protected class. Defendant
pharmacist will argue that patients seeking contraception are being re-
fused based on their choice of drugs, rather than based on their sex.
Specifically, the argument would be that the relevant manner of classify-
ing patients is women who present prescriptions for contraception or
emergency contraception and women who present prescriptions for
drugs that are not contraceptives. This was the analysis used in Gilbert,
where the Court reasoned that a disability benefits plan that excluded
pregnancy-related benefits was not discriminatory because the plan
"covers exactly the same categories of risk, and is facially nondiscrimina-
tory in the sense that '[t]here is no risk from which men are protected
and women are not.""35 Thus, a pharmacist might argue that women
are not denied a service (provision of contraception) that is available to
male patients because contraception is not made available to men either.
An analysis of the WLAD reveals that PDA analysis taking into ac-
count women's unique, sex-based characteristics (and not requiring a
similarly situated male who, by definition, lacks those characteristics)
should indeed be extended to places of public accommodation. First, the
WLAD makes clear in its Declaration of civil rights3 6 that the right to
be free from discrimination "because of" sex includes the right to full
enjoyment of places of public accommodation. 3 7 This is significant in
that the WLAD's inclusion of the PDA phrase "because of ... sex" evi-
dences an intention to extend the PDA analysis beyond the employment
context and into public accommodation cases.
Washington Courts should extend Title VII PDA analysis to prohi-
bitions on discrimination in places of public accommodation for several
reasons. First, WLAD is broader than the Federal Civil Rights Act in
that it protects women from discrimination in places of public accom-
135. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976) (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974).
136. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030(1) (2002).
137. Id. § 49.69.030(1)(b).
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modation, which Title II of the federal act neglects. 3 Secondly, Wash-
ington has promulgated state regulations perfectly parallel to the federal
PDA, evidencing its intention to protect women from discrimination on
the basis of their potential to become pregnant and its agreement with
Congress that the analysis in Gilbert does not adequately consider the
sex-based needs of women. Finally, Washington courts have consistently
used federal employment law analysis in adjudicating public accommo-
dation claims. For example, in interpreting the WLAD in the disability
discrimination context, Washington courts took guidance directly from
the application of Title VII employment principles to the ADA."9 Ac-
cordingly, for judicial consistency, Washington courts should again look
to Title VII for guidance in applying the public accommodation statute
to sex discrimination claims. The result would take women's sex-based
characteristics into account when assessing all sex discrimination claims.
B. Refusals Fall Inside Statutory Exceptions
A pharmacist facing a claim of discrimination under the public ac-
commodations statute may attempt to raise other statutory defenses.
Specifically, there are exceptions within the statute itself that permit
what would otherwise constitute discriminatory behavior. First, refusal
of service is permitted if it happens at a private club. 4° However, a
pharmacist can not assert with any force that a pharmacy is not a place
of public accommodation or falls within the definition of private club.
Second, there is an exception under the statute that allows refusal of ser-
vice when the complainant has engaged in improper conduct
constituting a risk to property or other persons."" Washington courts
have indicated that improper conduct in places of public accommoda-
tion includes shoplifting or public sexual contact.'4 2 While the refusing
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) ("All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoy-
ment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of
any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimina-
tion or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.").
139. Fell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 911 P.2d 1319, 1326-28 (Wash. 1996).
140. WAsH. REv. CODE § 49.60.040(10) (2002) ("[N]othing in this definition shall be
construed to include or apply to any institute, bona fide club, or place of accommo-
dation, which is by its nature distinctly private ..... ); see also Fraternal Order of
Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 59 P.3d
655, 668 (Wash. 2002).
141. WASH. Ri~v. CODE § 49.60.215; see also Lewis v. Doll, 765 P.2d 1341, 1345 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1989).
142. Lewis, 765 P.2d at 1345.
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pharmacist may suggest that use of contraception is improper conduct
according to the pharmacist's religious or moral beliefs, such a fringe
assertion that seeking access to a lawful prescription is improper would
certainly fail.
C Freedom of Religion: Religious Beliefi
Are Fundamentally Protected Rights
Once a woman has established her prima facie case under the
WLAD, the burden shifts to the defendant to show a non-
discriminatory reason for the discriminatory action. The burden then
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the non-discriminatory reason is
a mere pretext. 43 Accordingly, once a plaintiff has met her prima facie
case, the defendant pharmacist will assert "other non-discriminatory
reasons" for refusing to dispense drugs that are basic health care for
women.
One allegedly non-discriminatory reason that a pharmacist who re-
fuses to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception might assert is
that the refusal is based on a protected religious or moral belief. Specifi-
cally, the pharmacist will assert that a fundamental freedom of religion
provides a right to refuse to dispense contraceptives. While it is true that
the Washington State Constitution provides broad protection to free-
dom of religion, that freedom does not go unchecked.'44 Specifically,
while citizens may exercise freedom of conscience in their beliefs, they
may not exercise this belief in the form of actions such that the peace
and safety of the state are endangered.'45
The Supreme Court of the United States held in Cantwell v. Con-
necticut that even though the freedom to believe is absolute, the freedom
to act is subject to regulation for the protection of society.46 The Su-
preme Court of Washington has held that the freedom to act can be
143. Fell, 911 P.2d at 1331.
144. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 reads:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief
and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be
molested or disturbed in person or property on account of religion; but the
liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse
acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and
safety of the state.
145. Id.; see Backlund v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 724 P.2d 981, 986 (Wash. 1986) (holding that
restrictions on exercise of religious freedom may be justified by a compelling govern-
ment interest); see also infra note 150 and accompanying text.
146. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940).
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restricted "only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests
which the State may lawfully protect." 147 Additionally, "conduct moti-
vated by religious beliefs may be subject to regulation if that conduct
conflicts with the exercise of the interests of third parties." 148 Finally,
"[i] n the area of health and safety, governmental interests often override
individual objections to regulations relating thereto. , 141 In sum, while
religious beliefs are protected, actions based on those beliefs are not pro-
tected when those actions result in a violation of law or endangerment
of the public health.
Washington courts have found a variety of governmental interests
to override religious free exercise.15° Specifically, the Supreme Court of
Washington found that a student's religiously-based refusal to submit to
a screening for tuberculosis as a condition for admission to the Univer-
sity of Washington presented a clear and present, grave and immediate
threat to the public health."' The court explained that the State's re-
quirement that all students be screened for tuberculosis is necessary for
protection of the public health. 52 Accordingly, "infringement of the
[student] 's rights is a necessary consequence of a practical attempt to
147. Backlund, 724 P.2d at 987 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 639 (1943)).
148. Backlund, 724 P.2d at 987.
149. Backlund, 724 P.2d at 987; see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, (1905)
(holding that certain mandatory vaccinations required by a state do not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp. Unit No. 1,
278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (holding that the State may require blood
transfusions for children over religious objections of parents), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598
(1968); State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 239 P.2d 545 (Wash. 1952) (holding
that University of Washington requirement that students have an X-ray examination
before registration to discover possible tuberculosis infections overrode religious ob-
jections thereto); Tenn. Dep't of Human Serv. V. Hamilton (In re Hamilton), 657
S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the State may require a twelve-
year-old girl to submit to cancer treatment over the religious objections of parents).
150. See e.g., Washington v. Meacham, 612 P.2d 795 (Wash. 1980) (holding the State has
a compelling interest in requiring blood tests for putative fathers, under the Uniform
Parentage Act, although providing blood was against the complaining parties' reli-
gious beliefs); Holcomb, 239 P.2d at 545-46 (holding the State has a compelling
interest in a state university rule requiring an X-ray of all incoming students for tu-
berculosis despite beliefs of a Christian Scientist student); Washington v. Clifford,
787 P.2d 571, 574-75 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) review denied, 792 P.2d 535 (holding
the State has a compelling interest in requirement for a driver's license despite com-
plaining party's assertion that his god and religious community would monitor
them).
151. Ho/comb, 239 P.2d at 548.
152. Holcomb, 239 P.2d at 548.
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avoid danger." '153 Meanwhile, the student's "freedom to believe" remains
absolute. 54
More recently, the Supreme Court of Washington found that a
physician's religiously-based refusal to comply with a rule requiring him
to carry professional liability insurance was overridden by the state's
compelling interest in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens.'55
Moreover, the court reasoned that the physician
freely chose to enter into the profession of medicine. Those
who enter into a profession as a matter of choice, necessarily
face regulation as to their own conduct and their voluntarily
imposed personal limitations cannot override the regulatory
schemes which bind others in that activity. [His professional]
practice is open to the public. He enjoys the economic benefits
of his practice .... Therefore, with these benefits come corre-
sponding burdens .... '56
A pharmacist's freedom to believe that contraception is immoral is
certainly a fundamental and protected right. The pharmacist's freedom
to act, however, is not so protected. Indeed, the freedom to act may be
regulated and restricted to protect the public health and safety. Like the
physician in Backlund, a pharmacist freely chooses to enter the profes-
sion of pharmacy and works in a place of public accommodation. The
pharmacist thus faces the limitations of all laws, including those appli-
cable to proper behavior in places of public accommodation that
prohibit discrimination and particularly those that apply to licensed
healthcare professionals. 5 7 A pharmacist may not refuse to comply with
those laws on the basis that religious or moral beliefs dictate discrimina-
tory behavior. Moreover, even if refusals are not deemed discriminatory,
refusals result in a denial of health care that interferes with the health
and safety of citizens of the state.
Provision of contraception, a basic element of health care for
women, is crucial to public health. In the case of emergency contracep-
tion, access is essential to health and safety of patients in that the drug is
most effective when taken within seventy-two hours of unprotected in-
tercourse.'58 Refusal to dispense emergency contraception would result
153. Holcomb, 239 P.2d at 548.
154. Holcomb, 239 P.2d at 548.
155. Backlund v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 724 P.2d 981, 988 (Wash. 1986).
156. Backlund, 724 P.2d at 990.
157. See WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.010 (West 2002).
158. Holcomb, 239 P.2d at 548 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 639 (1943)).
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in unintended pregnancies and, for some women potentially life-
threatening circumstances." 9 As many as one in every 2,800 women in
developed countries, including the United States, faces risk of death re-
sulting from pregnancy in the course of her lifetime.1 60 Because access to
contraception is crucial to the public health and safety, pharmacists' re-
ligiously-motivated refusal to dispense contraception must be
prohibited.
D. Employers Must Make a Reasonable Accommodation
for Religious Belief#
Pharmacists will argue that even if there is no fundamental right to
refuse based on religious beliefs, the employer pharmacy is required to
make a reasonable accommodation to those beliefs or else face a charge
of employment discrimination.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act protects employees from discrimi-
nation based upon their religious beliefs."' In 1972, Title VII was
amended to require employers "'to make reasonable accommodations,
short of undue hardship, for the religious practices of employees and
prospective employees.' ,162 Generally, a plaintiff can establish a prima
facie case of employment discrimination by showing that
he had a sincere religious belief that conflicted with an em-
ployment requirement, that he placed the employer on notice
of the need for accommodation, or that the employer pos-
sessed enough information about his religious needs to
understand that there was a need for accommodation and that
the employer failed to reasonably accommodate his needs.
163
159. World Health Organization, Maternal Mortality in 2000: Estimates developed by
WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, at 1 (2004).
160. Id. at 2.
161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); id. § 2000e(b) (applying only to employers of fifteen
or more employees).
162. ABIGAIL COOLEY MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw, 2-127 (3rd ed.
2006) (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977)). "The
term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as be-
lief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to
an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without un-
due hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)
(2002).
163. MODJESKA, supra note 162, at 2-127 to -128 (citations omitted).
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Additionally, plaintiff must specifically request a reasonable ac-
commodation rather than merely asserting "an unqualified right to
disobey orders that he deems inconsistent with his faith. ... " Fur-
thermore, an employer may escape liability by either attempting to
negotiate with the employee to reasonably accommodate the belief or by
showing "that accommodation 'could not be accomplished without un-
due hardship' and that there was, therefore, no need to engage in
'fruitless dialogue.' ,,165
According to the EEOC, examples of reasonable accommodations
include job reassignments, flexible scheduling lateral transfers, and vol-
untary substitutions with other employees.' On the other hand, the
employer is not required to accommodate religious beliefs to the point
that it creates an "undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business. 1 67 Title VII does not define "undue hardship", so the "'precise
reach of the employer's obligation.., must be determined on a case-by-
case basis."" 68 The Supreme Court of the United States and the EEOC
regulations explain that undue hardship can be demonstrated by imposi-
tion of "more than a de minimis cost" to the employer.1 69 "More than de
minimis cost" refers to not only economic and monetary cost, such as
lost business or hiring additional employees, but also includes the non-
economic burden imposed on the employer in conducting its business
and unequal treatment of employees.'
70
For example, in Trans WoridAirlines, Inc. v. Hardison, the Supreme
Court of the United States found that where an employee's religious be-
liefs prevented him from working on certain days or assignments,
requiring an employer either to assign replacements or to offer premium
wages for volunteer replacements would entail more than a de minimis
cost in the form of lost efficiency or higher wages.' 7' Other examples of
an undue hardship include forcing an employer to hire additional
164. Id. at 2-128 (citing Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2003)).
165. Id. at 2-128 to -130 (quoting Brown v. Polk County, Iowa, 61 F. 3d 650 (3rd Cir.
1990); Weber v. Roadway Exp., Inc. 199 F.3d 270 (5th Cit. 2000)).
166. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1) (2006); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, Religious Discrimination (Feb. 2, 2007), http://www.eeoc.gov/types/
religion.html.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
168. MODJESKA, supra note 162, at 2-138 (quoting Beadle v. Hillsborough County Sher-
iffs Dep't, 29 F.3d 589 (1994)).
169. 29 C.F.R. 1605.2(e) (2006) (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
170. Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 84; Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d
126, 134-35 (1st Cir. 2004).
171. Trans WorldAirlines, 432 U.S. at 84.
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staff, 1 2 requiring other employees to assume a disproportionate amount
of the workload,' or forcing the employer to violate the law.7 Accom-
modating an employee who objects to a "substantial proportion of the
duties of a particular position," rather than a "minute percentage," can
also cause the employer undue hardship. 
71
There is one case that specifically speaks to accommodating a
pharmacist's religious objection to selling prescription contraceptives. In
Noesen v. Medical Staffing Network Inc. ,176 a pharmacist, Neil Noesen,
refused to be involved in dispensing any form of contraceptives because
of his religious beliefs. He notified his employer, who agreed to accom-
modate the religious belief by ensuring that an additional pharmacist
would always be on duty to fill prescriptions and answer inquiries re-
lated to contraceptives. 1 Noesen's employment was terminated when he
refused to notify the other pharmacist on duty that a customer needed
assistance with birth control.' At issue was whether the employer made
a reasonable accommodation to Noesen's religious beliefs under the Title
VII." The United States District Court for the Western District of Wis-
consin granted summary judgment for the employer, reasoning that
Noesen's beliefs were accommodated by ensuring the presence of an ad-
ditional pharmacist to meet patients' needs.' ° However, the employer
was not required to make the additional accommodation of allowing
172. Lee v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 22 F.3d 1019, 1023 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that the
cost of hiring an additional worker can be more than a de minimis cost); Brener v.
Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir. 1982) (hiring substitute for
pharmacist who requires days for religious observance is more than a de minimis cost).
173. Bruffv. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2001) (requiring
other counselors in employee assistance program to assume disproportionate work-
load to accommodate another counselor who refused to counsel clients on subjects
conflicting with her religious beliefs was an undue hardship as a matter of law).
174. Hover v. Florida Power & Light Co., No. 93-14236-CIV-RYSKAMP, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19920 (D. Fla. Nov. 14, 1994) (requiring employer to falsify social se-
curity number for internal purposes is an undue hardship, as it is unreasonable to ask
employer to intentionally violate federal regulations of the Internal Revenue Code).
175. See Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1180, 1184. (D.D.C. 1979) (explain-
ing that where an employee of the IRS refused to process tax-exemption proposals for
pro-choice groups, and the objection affected the processing of less than two percent
of the volume of applications, the IRS should have no difficulty accommodating the
employee's religious beliefs because that small number of applications could be clearly
processed without undue hardship to the IRS).
176. No. 06-C-071-S, 2006 WL 1529664, at *1 (W.D. Wis. June 1, 2006).
177. Noesen, 2006 WL 1529664, at *2.
178. Noesen, 2006 WL 1529664, at *3.
179. Noesen, 2006 WL 1529664, at *3.
180. Noesen, 2006 WL 1529664, at *4.
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Noesen to completely ignore patients or leave them on hold indefi-
nitely. 81 It is clear from this case that customer abandonment constitutes
an undue burden on the employer and thus is not considered a reason-
able accommodation for religious beliefs under Title VII.
Pharmacists refusing to fill prescriptions for contraception on the
basis of religious beliefs do not have an unrestricted right to decline to
perform portions of their job duties. While a pharmacist may request
that the employer reasonably accommodate her or his beliefs, the em-
ployer is not obligated to undergo an undue hardship. What constitutes
a reasonable accommodation and an undue hardship will be different
depending on the facts and circumstances at each pharmacy. For exam-
ple, flexible scheduling and voluntary shift substitutions might not
create an undue hardship on a very large pharmacy that regularly sched-
ules multiple pharmacists to work at the same time. On the other hand,
these measures might indeed cause an undue hardship at a small phar-
macy that schedules only one pharmacist at a time.
Generally speaking, a pharmacy will not be required to hire addi-
tional staff, compel other employees to take on a disproportionate
amount of the workload, compromise customer service, or violate the
law.182 Accordingly, because a flat refusal to fill prescriptions for contra-
ceptives constitutes sex discrimination in a place of public
accommodation and violated the WLAD, employers are not obligated
to simply allow pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions. Even if such
refusals do not constitute sex discrimination, they certainly compromise
customer service and negatively affect business such that the refusal
causes an undue hardship on the employer beyond its obligation to ac-
commodate.
In conclusion, a woman bringing a claim of sex discrimination in a
place of public accommodation when she is refused basic health care will
be able to proceed with her case despite the many defenses that a phar-
macist will assert. First, discrimination based on the potential to become
pregnant is sex discrimination on its face, as determined by Congress
and the Supreme Court of the United States. This analysis should be
extended to places of public accommodation in Washington as demon-
strated by Washington courts' repeated willingness to extend federal
employment discrimination principles to the arena of public accommo-
dation. Second, none of the exceptions within the WLAD apply to
181. Noesen, 2006 WL 1529664, at *5.
182. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977); Brener v. Diag-
nostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir. 1982); Bruff v. N. Miss. Health
Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 500-02 (5th Cir. 2001); Noesen, 2006 WL 1529664, at
*4.
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pharmacist refusals. Third, the fundamental freedom of religion protect-
ing the beliefs of pharmacists does not extend to allow unfettered
discriminatory behavior that interferes with the public health and wel-
fare, as refusals to dispense inevitably do. Finally, employers are required
to make reasonable accommodations to pharmacists' religious beliefs
provided that they do not cause more than a de minimis cost to the em-
ployer. The bar here is low, and while some larger employers may be
willing and able to accommodate pharmacist employees, many will not
be required to do so because most accommodations will create more
than a de minimis cost to the employer. Women will prevail in claims of
sex discrimination in places of public accommodation entirely consis-
tent with Washington law and policy.
IV. WASHINGTON PUBLIC POLICY PROTECTS
REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM
Washington provides several unique protections for women and
their reproductive freedom. First, Washington voters approved an
amendment to the state constitution granting equal rights to women in
the form of the state Equal Rights Amendment."' Second, the Washing-
ton State Legislature declared that every woman has a fundamental right
to choose contraception, abortion, or neither.184 Additionally, the legisla-
ture declared, "IT]he state shall not discriminate against the exercise of
these rights in the regulation or provision of benefits, facilities, services,
or information." '85 Third, as discussed earlier, the Washington HRC has
promulgated regulations prohibiting discrimination in employment
based on a woman's pregnancy or potential to become pregnant. 6
Fourth, Washington protects women's access to reproductive health care
in regulations requiring comprehensive health plans to include coverage
for contraceptives.187 As is clear from the extensive protections granted to
women's reproductive freedom, Washington values its women and their
ability to exert control over their reproductive futures. These protections
183. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1 ("Equality of rights and responsibility under the law
shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex.").
184. WASH. REV. CODE 5 9.02.100 (2003) ("[I]t is the public policy of the state of Wash-
ington that: (1) Every individual has the fundamental right to choose or refuse birth
control; (2) Every woman has the fundamental right to choose or refuse to have an
abortion .... ).
185. Id. § 9.02.100(4).
186. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 162-30-020 (2005).
187. Id. at 284-43-822(1).
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are of little benefit if access may be denied and discrimination may pre-
vail at the pharmacy.
Washington has taken extensive measures to protect each of its citi-
zens from wrongful discrimination. The WLAD, initially enacted as a
law against employment discrimination in 1949, has repeatedly been
expanded over the years to provide greater protections for the citizens of
Washington State. 88 The Supreme Court of Washington has held that
the purpose of the law is to deter and to eradicate discrimination.'9 Ad-
ditionally, the court has also held that the law is to be construed liberally
to accomplish its purposes. 90 In fact, the court has specifically inter-
preted Washington state laws more broadly than federal anti-
discrimination laws because "unlike our state law against discrimination,
Title VII does not contain a broad statement of the right to be free from
discrimination in other areas. Our state law does."' 9 It is clear from the
language of the statute and the actions of Washington courts that the
WLAD is to be interpreted as broadly as possible to achieve the purpose
of deterring and eradicating all forms of discrimination. 192
It follows naturally that Washington state policy protecting women
should not stop in places of public accommodation. As the Washington
State Supreme Court said of the WLAD, its purpose is "to prevent and
eliminate discrimination in all public settings."'93 Women should be
protected from discrimination and should be granted access to health
care at pharmacies. To be sure, there are many who disagree and feel that
pharmacists should have the right to turn patients away on religious
grounds. However, while religious beliefs are protected, those beliefs
should not be protected to the extent that they override the rights of
others to seek vital health care.
188. See Marquis v. City of Spokane, 922 P.2d 43, 48 (Wash. 1996) (citing LAWS OF 1949,
ch. 183).
189. Mackay v. Acorn Custom Cabinetry, Inc., 898 P.2d 284, 287-88 (Wash. 1995).
190. Marquis, 922 P.2d at 49.
191. Marquis, 922 P.2d at 49 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.0 10).
192. See generally Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fra-
ternal Order of Eagles, 59 P.3d 655 (Wash. 2002); Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide
Co., 20 P.3d 921 (Wash. 2001); Martini v. Boeing Co., 971 P.2d 45 (Wash. 1999);
Marquis, 922 P.2d 43; Xieng v. Peoples Nat'l Bank of Wash., 844 P.2d 389 (Wash.
1993); MacLean v. First Nw. Indus. of Am., Inc., 635 P.2d 683, 684-86 (Wash.
1981); Pham v. City of Seattle, 103 P.3d 827 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
193. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 59 P.3d at 671.
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CONCLUSIONS, SUGGESTIONS AND SOLUTIONS
Contraception and emergency contraception are basic health care
for women. As equal participants in society, women deserve access to
basic health care equal to that of all other citizens. Religious and moral
beliefs of pharmacists acting as gatekeepers should not stand in the way
of basic care. Women living in a state that protects reproductive freedom
to the extent that Washington does should be able to walk into a phar-
macy, present a prescription for emergency contraception, and have that
prescription filled without delay or disrespect. Anything short of seam-
less delivery of care constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex in a
place of public accommodation.
As described in this Article, case law requires that prescription con-
traceptives receive the same level of respect as other medications.
Because contraception affects only the health of women, its denial is sex
discrimination on its face whether that denial occurs in the workplace or
the pharmacy. With the many rights that women have fought for over
the course of history, we cannot allow pharmacists to control the repro-
ductive destiny, and thus the social and economic future, of women.
A policy allowing pharmacists to "refuse and refer," that is, to refuse
to fill and then refer the patient to another pharmacy, does not comport
with the level of protection granted to women and reproductive freedom
in the State of Washington. It allows pharmacists to humiliate women
and then forces them to sacrifice valuable time searching the city,
county, or even state, for a pharmacist that will provide health care.
Moreover, considering that the nearest pharmacy may be many miles
away for women living in rural areas, "refuse and refer" policies can
cause the individual to be unable to have her prescription filled in a
timely manner. This practice is unacceptable particularly when the cru-
cial drug, emergency contraception, is time dependent and loses efficacy
as time progresses. Simply put, a policy allowing "refuse and refer" rein-
forces sex discrimination and results in the disempowerment and
subjugation of women.
The only defensible position that allows pharmacists to refuse to
dispense emergency contraception is one that requires another pharma-
cist available to promptly fill the prescription on-site and ensures that
patients receive care without delay, disrespect, or discrimination. No
patient should ever be discriminated against by being turned away,
forced to face delay, forced to travel, or forced to search for another
pharmacy that is willing to provide her care. Additionally, patients
2007]
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should never be exposed to the fact that a pharmacist or other staff
member objects to their basic health care choices.
Employers that are able to accommodate religious objections with-
out sacrificing the seamless delivery of care should do so. This process
would require pharmacists to notify their employers of objections to
filling prescriptions for emergency contraception. Those pharmacies that
are able to accommodate the objections by means of scheduling or other
simple means should do so. Pharmacies should also institute policies
describing how patients seeking emergency contraception should be
treated. These policies should prohibit the obstruction of care and re-
quire that each patient be treated with dignity and respect.
The HRC should either issue a policy statement or enact a rule
clarifying the reach of the statute and protecting the reproductive health
of women because courts "must give great weight to the statute's inter-
pretation by the agency charged with its administration ... 194 Such
clarification would strengthen protection of reproductive freedoms and
allow women to successfully pursue claims of sex discrimination in
places of public accommodation against pharmacists who insist on plac-
ing personal beliefs above the health and safety of women.
Notably, on April 12, 2007, the Washington State Board of Phar-
macy voted unanimously to adopt two rules imposing a duty on
pharmacists to fill valid prescriptions.'95 Pharmacists who violate the rule
may be subject to disciplinary proceedings from the Board of Phar-
macy.116 The adoption of this rule not only bolsters Washington's policy
of protecting access to contraception, it also provides an additional rem-
edy for women who are refused care. However, the extent to which the
new rules will be used by and prove beneficial to women seeking to gain
access to ECPs is something which is presently undeterminable since the
rules go into effect in mid-June of the current year."'
Finally, although this Article focuses on Washington law, it is im-
portant to note that forty-five states have included sex in their public
accommodation statutes and thus provide protection for women in pub-
lic places. Accordingly, the analysis set forth can be applied within those
states as well. Plaintiffs in any of those states should examine their pub-
lic accommodation statutes as well as statutes related to contraceptive
194. See Marquis, 922 P.2d at 50.
195. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 246-869-010, -863-095 (2007); MSNBC.com, Board: Drug-
gists Can't Refuse Prescriptions (Apr. 13, 2007), http://www.msnbc.msn.coml
id/18090057.
196. WASH. Rav. CODE § 18.64.005 (1990) (granting the Washington State Board of
Pharmacy the authority to "enforce all laws placed under its jurisdiction.").
197. MSNBC.com, supra note 195.
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coverage and pregnancy discrimination to determine whether they may
be able to successfully pursue a sex discrimination claim when a phar-
macist refuses to dispense emergency contraception. t

